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What level of First Amendment protection should we afford tattooing?
General public consensus formerly condemned tattoos as barbaric, but
the increasingly diverse clientele of tattoo shops suggests that tattoos
have become more mainstream. However, the law has struggled to adjust. The recent proliferation of municipal near-bans on tattooing has
brought tattooing to the forefront of First Amendment debates, with
cases such as Anderson and Coleman leading the way toward recognizing tattooing as pure speech. Tensions between formal and informal
copyright norms in the tattoo industry further highlight the collaborative and expressive nature of the artist-customer relationship and its
resulting products, revealing a need for more robust First Amendment
protection. This Note examines the three primary schools of thought in
First Amendment–tattoo jurisprudence and advocates for full speech
protections for tattooing by requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to
all content-based speech regulations. This approach would better align
with existing informal copyright norms by encouraging further creation
of expressive speech and avoiding subjective judicial inquiries.

INTRODUCTION
With the recent rise and threat of municipal regulations potentially encumbering the production of tattoos, tattoo artists currently rely on First
Amendment speech protections to adequately protect their work. These regulations reflect an increasingly outdated public consensus that typically associates tattoos with “barbaric” and “morbid or abnormal personalit[ies].”1
Today, however, over twenty percent of American adults now have one or
*
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2013; Managing Editor, Vol. 19,
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review. My gratitude goes to the entire
MTTLR Volume 20 editorial staff and especially to Helen Ji, Carlyn Williams, and Daniel
Zwick for their tireless comments.
1.
See Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 1964).
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more tattoos.2 Tattoos continue to attract a wider range of customers as they
are increasingly used to commemorate special events or signify important
personal beliefs.3 In an interview with NPR, the owner of Fatty’s Custom
Tattooz in Washington, D.C. stated that “in the last 10 years tattooing has
become mainstream[,]” and that his customer base has shifted to include
high profile clients such as judges, lawyers, and priests.4 As societal acceptance of tattoos increases, the approach of the law to tattooing as a protected
form of expression must continue to adjust in turn. The current spectrum of
viewpoints as to whether tattooing deserves protection as an act of speech
remains somewhat disjointed, but the recent case Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) sheds light on why tattooing
should receive full speech protections. This Note seeks to expand on Anderson’s protective approach by addressing the following questions: Should expressive conduct receive less First Amendment protection than the act of
displaying expression? How many speakers are involved in each act of tattooing, and whose expression should courts seek to protect? What tensions
exist between informal copyright norms and formal copyright law, and what
unforeseen constitutional implications might the latter’s literal application
create?
Over the past few years, news publications have begun to support tattoos as powerful speech-like symbols, and courts have addressed tattoobased claims with increasing frequency. In September 2012, the New York
Times ran a piece about Holocaust survivors’ relatives getting matching
number tattoos to memorialize the Holocaust and fuel further discussions
about racism and tolerance.5 In October 2012, a California appellate court
ruled that a defendant’s probation restriction forbidding the defendant from
obtaining new gang-related tattoos was overbroad under the First Amendment.6 Although the court rewrote the restriction to pass constitutional muster, the ruling implied that tattoos often serve as symbolic speech and
restrictions on receiving tattoos could result in a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression.7
2.
Samantha Braverman, Sr., One in Five Adults Now Has a Tattoo, HARRIS INTERAC(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/
1508/articleId/970/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx.
3.
Matthew Alan Cherep, Comment, Barbie Can Get a Tattoo, Why Can’t I?: First
Amendment Protection of Tattooing in a Barbie World, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 331, 331
(2011).
4.
See Tattoos Still Taboo?, NPR (May 22, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2013/05/22/186023466/tattoos-still-taboo.
5.
See Jodi Rudoren, Proudly Bearing Elders’ Scars, Their Skin Says ‘Never Forget’,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at A1.
6.
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Calif. Court Modifies Probation Rule on Gang-Related
Tattoos, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
calif-court-modifies-probation-rule-on-gang-related-tattoos.
7.
People v. Huerta, No. H037455, 2012 WL 4857345, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 15,
2012).
TIVE
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Although the First Amendment affords tattoos protection as symbolic
speech, protection for the process of tattooing is a more recent judicial trend.
Two recent cases in particular, Anderson and Coleman v. City of Mesa,8
demonstrate some courts’ burgeoning willingness to recognize the actual act
of tattooing as pure speech or protected expressive activity. These discussions of tattooing as speech raise complicated questions about the boundaries of expression and the number of speakers involved in any given tattoo
transaction, leading this Note to contrast the First Amendment’s concept of
the “speaker(s)” with copyright law’s concept of the “author(s).” Copyright
vests initially in the “author” of a work of authorship, granting that party (or
parties) with specifically enumerated rights.9 Similarly, First Amendment
law protects speakers’ expressions, making the determinations of authorship
and speakership critical to the protection of the various rights at stake. But
such determinations may prove complicated and even conflicting in the client-tattooer relationship when applying formal copyright law too literally.
Rather, this Note argues that in tattooing, where each act likely involves a
collaborative process between two or more speakers and authors, the multiple layers of expression at hand demand full speech protections. This approach supports Anderson’s First Amendment legacy and better aligns with
the tattoo industry’s informal, communal copyright norms.
Part I of this Note examines the three primary schools of thought in First
Amendment–tattoo jurisprudence, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of each approach and related proposals. It further delineates the relevant
First Amendment framework surrounding the process of tattooing and its
future implications, viewed through the lens of two recent cases: Anderson
and Coleman. Part II describes existing intellectual property norms in the
tattoo industry and argues that lawmakers should seek to understand and
incorporate these norms into existing First Amendment theories in order to
adequately protect freedom of expression. Part III lays out my proposed solution to the tattooing-as-speech problem in media law, suggesting that
courts take an “Anderson-Plus” approach that applies full First Amendment
protections to tattooing. I argue that courts should look beyond the text of
speech regulations to determine whether they are content-based as a practical matter before applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, in order to more
fully protect those speakers’ expressions deserving of First Amendment protection. Such an approach would more accurately square with existing informal copyright norms by focusing on encouraging further creation and
respect for tattooing as an ancient art form, avoiding the problematic implications of formal copyright law.

8.
9.

Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 870 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc).
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012); id. § 106.
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I. THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN FIRST AMENDMENT-TATTOO
JURISPRUDENCE: EXISTING PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, bans laws that abridge the freedom of speech.10 Although the
First Amendment clearly includes pure speech, not everything that communicates an idea counts as “speech.” Conduct intending to express an idea
is constitutionally protected only if it meets the Spence test, which applies to
expressive conduct. The Spence test states that conduct will only be protected by the First Amendment if it is “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication”—that is, if there is “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message” and “the likelihood [is] great that the message [will] be understood” by viewers.11 The government generally has wider latitude in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting written or spoken words.12
Courts and scholars have taken three categorically distinct approaches to
tackling the tattooing-as-speech problem in media law.13 The first and most
widely discussed approach—the Anderson and Coleman approach—holds
that the act of tattooing is purely expressive activity fully protected by the
First Amendment, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.
A second pre-Anderson approach holds the opposite, finding that tattooing is
not protected by the First Amendment because it is not itself expressive conduct. Before Anderson, many courts drew a distinction between the product
and the process of tattooing, holding that the physical process is conduct
subject to Spence’s “sufficiently imbued” test.14 These courts have further
concluded that tattooing fails the Spence test because it is not intended to
convey a particular message and is not sufficiently communicative.15 A third
10.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058.
11.
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–12 (1974).
12.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058-59 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
13.
A fourth approach—treating tattooing as protected expressive conduct or symbolic
speech that must pass intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien—is discussed in infra notes 24–25
and accompanying text. For further insight to this approach, see Massachusetts v. Meuse, No.
9877CR2644, 1999 WL 1203793, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 1999) and Lanphear v.
Massachusetts, No. 99-1896-B, 200 Mass. Super. LEXIS 711, at *11 (Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2000) (both cases are discussed in depth in Ryan J. Walsh, Comment, Painting on a Canvas of
Skin: Tattooing and the First Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 1079–80 (2011)); see also
Cherep, supra note 3, at 333 (contending that tattooing is protected symbolic speech and that
government regulations should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, leaving artists free to
create their expressions subject only to regulations that protect the public from serious health
risks).
14.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059–60.
15.
Id. at 1060. The Anderson court cites Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008), for the proposition that “[t]he act of tattooing
is one step removed from the actual expressive conduct” because it is not the process itself
which allows each customer to express a particularized message. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1060
It further cites Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253–54 (D. Minn. 1980), which held
that “the actual process of tattooing is not sufficiently communicative” to fall within the scope
of First Amendment protection because “there has been no showing that the normal observer
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approach refuses to treat tattooing categorically as either protected or unprotected activity and instead turns to a case-by-case inquiry.16 This moderate
approach, as seen in Mastrovincenzo, is currently gaining support in scholarly commentary. The following subsections will discuss the strengths and
problems of each approach.
A. The Anderson Approach: Tattooing is Purely Expressive Activity That
is Fully Protected by the First Amendment.
This first approach, which aims to recognize tattooing as purely expressive activity, is the approach taken by the courts in Anderson and Coleman.
However, even courts holding that tattooing is fully protected by the First
Amendment concede that this protection is not absolute.17 They find tattooing subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.18 Compared to
the Spence test, which only protects conduct “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,” this Anderson approach features increased scrutiny by requiring “reasonable,” non-content-based regulations that allow
alternative channels of communication, instead of mere regulations with a
rational relation to the government’s health and safety interest.19
In Anderson (later revisited in Coleman), the court strived to determine
whether the act of tattooing is either (1) purely expressive activity, akin to
writing, or (2) conduct that merely contains an expressive component, akin
to burning a draft card.20 Categorizing tattooing within this schema drastically affects the level of protection it receives, since pure speech–oriented
analysis would allow a greater amount of tattooing to survive regulations.
For example, if tattooing is purely expressive, the conduct is entitled to full
. . . would regard the process of injecting dye into a person’s skin through the use of needles as
communicative.“ Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1060.
16.
Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006).
17.
See, e.g., Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059 (even purely expressive activity may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
18.
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). This test asks
whether the restriction is (1) “justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech”; (2) is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”; and (3)
“leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Anderson,
621 F.3d at 1059. Laws that foreclose entire mediums of expression pose a danger to freedom
of speech and are almost never reasonable restrictions. Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Supposedly, the reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions test is a lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny’s “compelling state interest,” but
as a practical matter, I struggle to see how these similar tests could result in different outcomes. Id. at 1063.
19.
For example, in Anderson, the court disagreed with the City’s argument that tattoo
artists could employ designs on canvas or t-shirts as alternatives to skin, reasoning that
“[p]recisely because of [various signs’] location[s], such signs provide information about the
identity of the ‘speaker[,]’ . . . [which] is an important component of many attempts to persuade.” Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1066 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54, 56
(1994)).
20.
Id. at 1059; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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First Amendment protection. Consequently, the conduct can be regulated
only through reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.21 If, instead,
tattooing is conduct with an expressive component, it will be protected under
the First Amendment only if it meets the Spence “sufficiently imbued” test.22
If the “sufficiently imbued” test is satisfied, a city ordinance is governed by
O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny.23 The four-part test announced in O’Brien
analyzes restrictions on protected expressive conduct and is less demanding
than those tests established for regulations of pure speech.24 In O’Brien, the
Court held that a restriction on protected expressive conduct is constitutional
“[1] if it is within the constitutional powers of the Government; [2] it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”25 If, on the other hand,
tattooing is not sufficiently imbued with expressive elements but is merely
“conduct with an expressive component,” then the correct inquiry is whether
a city’s regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.26
1. The Anderson Opinion: Recognizing Tattooing as Pure Speech
In the widely-discussed 2010 case Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach,
tattoo artist Johnny Anderson filed a lawsuit arguing that the City’s ordinance effectively banning tattoo parlors was facially unconstitutional under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.27 The district court granted summary
21.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)); see supra note 18???? (discussing the reasonable time, place, and manner test in
greater detail). Note that Anderson did not contend that the City’s municipal ban was a content-based restriction on speech, since the City banned all tattoo parlors and not just those
conveying a particular kind of subject matter. Had such a claim been raised, the court would
have subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059 n.4.
22.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974)).
23.
Id.; see infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the O’Brien intermediate
scrutiny test).
24.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059.
25.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
26.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059 (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 68 (1981)).
27.
Id. at 1057. While the County generally permitted tattooing businesses, Hermosa
Beach itself did not. Id. Section 17.06.070 of the municipal code provided: “Except as provided in this title, no building shall be erected, reconstructed or structurally altered, nor shall
any building or land be used for any purpose except as hereinafter specifically provided and
allowed in the same zone in which such building and land is located.” HERMOSA BEACH, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 17.06.070 (2007), available at http://www.hermosabch.org/index.aspx?
page=418. No provision of Hermosa Beach’s zoning code permitted tattoo parlors, and as a
result, tattoo parlors were implicitly banned under § 17.06.070. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at
1057. The zoning provision of the Code provided for a wide variety of commercial uses,
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judgment to the City,28 finding that the act of tattooing was not protected
expression under the First Amendment “[b]ecause, although it is non-verbal
conduct expressive of an idea, it is not ‘sufficiently imbued with the elements of communication’” to receive First Amendment protection under the
Spence test.29 The district court reasoned that since the customer has “ultimate control over which design she wants tattooed on her skin[,]” the tattoo
artist therefore “does not convey an idea or message discernible to an identifiable audience[,]” so tattooing did not meet the Spence test.30 Applying a
rational basis review to the City’s ordinance, the court held that “[g]iven the
health risks inherent in operating tattoo parlors, . . . the City ha[d] a rational
basis for prohibiting tattoo parlors.”31
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Beginning with tattoos themselves, the court found that tattoos are “form[s] of pure expression entitled to
full constitutional protection.”32 Taking judicial notice of “the skill, artistry,
and care” demonstrated by modern tattooists, the court reasoned that “the
Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression”33 and “a form of speech does not lose First Amendment protection
based on the kind of surface it is applied to.”34 Although health and safety
concerns may be “relevant to the governmental interest potentially justifying

ranging from movie theaters and restaurants to adult businesses and gun shops, but did not
mention tattoo parlors. HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.26.030 (2007), available at
http://www.hermosabch.org/index.aspx?page=439. The expansive list of allowed commercial
ventures suggests an intentional omission by the City’s legislature, indicating that the City
does not consider tattooing to be a desirable or legitimate commercial use. Id. In fact, on
November 20, 2007, the City’s Planning Commission passed a resolution against amending the
Code to permit tattoo parlors, making explicit the ban against tattoo parlors in § 17.06.070. See
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1057.
28.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058. The district court initially dismissed the case for ripeness concerns, arguing that Anderson had not sought permission to operate a tattoo parlor
under the “similar use” provision in the administrative procedures provided in the City’s Code,
which allows the community development director “to permit a commercial use not listed in
the zoning code if this use ‘is similar to and not more objection[able] than other uses listed.’”
Id. at 1057. Anderson then filed a request with the community development director asking for
a finding of “similar use” that would allow him to open a tattoo parlor; however, his request
was denied, thereby prohibiting Anderson from opening a tattoo parlor in the City. Id.
29.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058. The Spence test applies to expressive conduct and
states that such conduct will only be protected by the First Amendment if it is “sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication”—that is, if there is “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and “the likelihood [is] great that the message [will] be understood” by viewers. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-11.
30.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1058.
31.
Id. at 1055.
32.
Id. at 1061.
33.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1060 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).
34.
Id. at 1061.
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a restriction on protected speech,” this consideration is not relevant “to
whether the speech is constitutionally protected.”35
Turning to the tattooing process, the Anderson court similarly concluded
that the process of tattooing is purely expressive activity that may be protected under the First Amendment.36 The court reasoned that the Spence test
only limits “processes that do not produce pure expression but rather produce symbolic conduct” that does not on its face necessarily convey a message.37 The court also emphasized that “neither the Supreme Court nor [the
Ninth Circuit] has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a
form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these
processes (the essay or the artwork) . . .”38 The court reasoned that tattooing
is a process much like writing. The process itself is not intended to “symbolize” anything; rather, its purpose is to produce a tattoo (just as writing is
intended to produce an essay).39 Since the tattooing process is “inextricably
intertwined with the purely expressive product (the resulting tattoo),” it is
entitled to full First Amendment protection. The fact that a tattooist provides
a service does not make the process any less expressive, because the process
of tattooing necessarily involves the application of the artist’s creative talents as well.40
Having determined that the process of tattooing receives First Amendment protection, the Anderson court held the City’s total ban on tattooing
was an unconstitutional restriction on free expression.41 In addition to finding the City’s regulation broader than necessary to achieve the government’s
cited interest in safety,42 the court held that the City’s regulation unconstitutionally “foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique
and important,” and one which “often carries a message quite distinct” from
other media.43 Significantly, Anderson means that “complete municipal bans
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit further held that “[t]he tattoo itself . . . and even the
business of tattooing are not expressive conduct but purely expressive activity fully protected
by the First Amendment.” Id. The court determined that the fact that the City’s ban relates to
tattooing businesses rather than the tattooing process itself does not affect whether the regulated activity is afforded First Amendment protection. Id. at 1062–63. The fact that artists
receive compensation does not, and should not, alter the calculus. Id. at 1063; see also Riley v.
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (“It is well settled that a
speaker’s rights are not lost merely because compensation is received; a speaker is no less a
speaker because he or she is paid to speak.”). Regardless of any accompanying commercial
aspect, tattoos still express ideas, make statements, and “affect public attitudes” by encouraging thoughtful contemplation and discussion among their viewers. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1063
(citing White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2007)).
37.
Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971)).
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 1062.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 1059, 1063.
42.
Id. at 1065 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 800 (1989)).
43.
Id. at 1066 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54, 56 (1994)).
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on tattoo parlors are now illegal in the nine states under the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction,” which encompasses approximately 19.93 percent of the U.S.
population.44 Although Anderson provides significant breathing room in
favor of tattooing and eliminates the threat of overbroad regulations in some
states, other jurisdictions remain free to employ less-protective methods.
2. The Coleman Opinion: Support for Anderson’s Approach
Decided almost exactly two years after Anderson, the Arizona Supreme
Court case Coleman v. City of Mesa sheds new light on First Amendment–tattoo jurisprudence and expands the territory for judicial debate as to
what level of First Amendment protection tattooing should be afforded.
Coleman builds on the tattoo-protective approach provided by Anderson by
holding that the business of tattooing constitutes pure speech. Although
Coleman is a state case outside of the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, and therefore not bound by Anderson,45 the case illustrates a growing trend among
courts toward recognizing tattooing as protected expressive activity.
In Coleman, the City Council rejected an application for a permit to
operate a tattoo parlor, citing concerns that it was not appropriate for the
location or in the neighborhood’s best interests.46 On appeal, the Coleman
court agreed with Anderson that tattooing is purely expressive activity fully
protected by the First Amendment.47 Finding it “incontrovertible” that a tattoo itself is pure speech, the court pointed to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a vast range of First Amendment–protected expressive activity,
“including parades, music, paintings, and topless dancing.”48 Like the Anderson court, the Coleman court found that an expression’s protected status
cannot depend upon the medium chosen for its expression, and that the process of tattooing is expressive activity.49
44.
Matthew Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property Law and
Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1175–76 (2012).
45.
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Tattoos are Pure Speech, Ariz. Appeals Court Rules,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/tattoos-arepure-speech-ariz-appeals-court-rules. The Coleman court reversed and remanded the trial
court’s decision, directing the trial court to evaluate the Colemans’ free speech claims. See
Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 874 (Ariz. 2012).
46.
Coleman, 284 P.3d at 866. Mesa City Code requires tattoo parlors and other specified businesses (including piercing salons and pawn shops) to obtain a permit in order to
conduct business within the City. See MESA CITY CODE § 11–6–3(B) (2012). A permit serves
as a “discretionary authorization” that the City Council may issue after a public hearing if it
finds that the proposed activity will accord with and is not harmful to “adjacent properties or
the neighborhood in general.” Coleman, 284 P.3d at 867-68.
47.
Coleman, 284 P.3d at 869 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995) (“[P]urely expressive activity’ and ‘pure
speech’ . . . refer not only to written or spoken words, but also to other media (such as painting, music, and film) that predominantly serve to express thoughts, emotions, or ideas.”).
48.
Id. at 869-70 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569; Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1060).
49.
Id. at 870 (citing Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061–62; State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420,
425 (S.C. 2002) (Waller, J., dissenting)). Tattooing constitutes expressive activity since a tat-
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In response to the Colemans’ claim that the First Amendment protects
the right of tattoo artists to engage in creative expression by operating tattoo
parlors, the City countered that the court need not determine whether tattooing is constitutionally protected expression because “generally applicable
zoning laws may apply to otherwise protected activities” without violating
any free speech rights.50 However, the unconvinced court reasoned that
“[t]he fact that a permit scheme may also apply to non-protected activities
does not insulate it from constitutional challenge when applied to protected
speech.”51
Coleman builds on the tattoo-protective approach provided by Anderson, similarly holding that because tattoos are pure speech, the business of
tattooing “also constitutes pure speech.”52 Since the case has been sent back
to the trial court to evaluate the Colemans’ free speech claims, that court will
be tasked with evaluating whether the City imposed a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction in denying the permit, or whether its regulation was
not narrowly tailored to its municipal goals. No matter how the lawsuit ultimately plays out, the Arizona decision played a significant role in recognizing tattooing as a form of expression that deserves of First Amendment
protection.53
3. The Anderson Approach: Discussion and Criticism
Anderson and Coleman take an important step toward recognizing tattooing as fully protected speech. Both involve an interesting twist: there is
no regulation on the tattooing activity itself, but rather the regulation regards
the very establishment of tattoo parlors.54 Although not the focus of this
Note, it is important to briefly highlight that without such regulations, the
too “involves expressive elements beyond those present in ‘a pen-and-ink’ drawing, inasmuch
as a tattoo reflects not only the work of the tattoo artist but also the self-expression of the
person displaying the tattoo’s relatively permanent image.” Id. This reflection explains why
the court was not persuaded by contrary “No-Protection Approach” decisions such as Hold
Fast Tattoo and Yurkew (see infra Part I.B), which rely on the Spence test to determine that
tattooing is not protected by the First Amendment.
50.
Id. at 868. The City cited Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 430, 447–49 (1991), which
found no “First Amendment difficulties” in applying a general tax to the media, and Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986), which held that the closing of an adult bookstore
(where solicitation of prostitution occurred) was not precluded by the First Amendment.
51.
Id. at 868; see, e.g., Thomas v. Chic. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (involving a
challenge to a city ordinance requiring permits for large-party events in public parks).
52.
See Hudson, Jr., supra note 45.
53.
Id.
54.
Both cases provide key examples of local governments using zoning restrictions as a
way to functionally ban the activity of tattooing before it can take place, arguably using licensing as a prior restraint. The Anderson and Coleman opinions refrain from using any language
directly related to “prior restraints,” leaving open the possibility of continued restraints via
similar ordinances that grant city officials discretion to determine which businesses are in the
best interests of the community. See Carly Strocker, Comment, These Tats Are Made for Talking: Why Tattoos and Tattooing Are Protected Speech Under the First Amendment, 31 LOY.
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tattooing-as-speech debate would not have arisen in the judicial arena. These
regulations, combined with the framework courts have developed to address
competing speech interests, point to the need for a clearer division between
the available tiers of First Amendment scrutiny. Primarily, courts need to
address the distinction between “purely expressive activity” (subject to “reasonable” time, place, and manner restrictions) and “expressive conduct”
(subject to the Spence test).55 Treating all tattooing as purely expressive activity, in line with Anderson and with the informal copyright norms discussed in Part II.B, would avoid these complicated inquiries and better
protect the act of tattooing and the resulting tattoos by recognizing multiple
speakers and multiple authors.
Despite the uncertainties of its future application, the Anderson approach—recognizing tattooing as purely expressive activity—has received
support from numerous voices. For example, in her Note, Laura Markey
agrees that tattooing is a purely expressive activity, but criticizes the refusal
of prior courts to define the extent of constitutional protection given to tattoos as artistic expression.56 Arguing that the “First Amendment would mean
little if it allowed the government to ban any speech it finds perverse or
undesirable,”57 Markey dismisses the history of negative connotations imparted upon tattoos, including the now largely-quelled concerns about hepatitis and views of tattoo-bearers as having “morbid or abnormal
personalit[ies].”58 In particular, Markey argues against Spence’s expressive
conduct test because the “separation of tattooing and the resulting tattoos” is
“illogical.”59 Markey advocates for formal government regulation of tattooing and the repeal of all local bans on the practice, commending the Anderson court for “not assign[ing] more importance to the government interest of

L.A. ENT. L. REV. 175, 206–07 (2011) (advocating for stricter constitutional review of tattoo
bans that resemble prior restraints).
55.
Conduct with expressive components can be fairly heavily regulated under O’Brien.
For a discussion of the O’Brien test, see supra note 25 and accompanying text. If not sufficiently imbued with elements of communication, regulations need only be rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest. Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1059 (citing Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981)). This distinction may mean that a great deal of
otherwise protectable speech will arbitrarily fall into the heavily-regulated category, since the
“health and safety” government interest will almost always pass rational basis and often even
intermediate scrutiny.
56.
Laura Markey, Repairing the Rusty Needle: Recognizing First Amendment Protection for Tattoos, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 310, 321 (2012) (citing Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495
F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (D. Minn. 1980)) (arguing that the appropriate level of protection “should
not have been a mere intrigue; it should have been obvious”).
57.
Id. at 322.
58.
Id. at 315-16 (citing Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div.
1964)).
59.
Id. at 324-25
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public safety than was necessary in context” and urging other courts to follow the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive opinion in the future.60
Similarly, commentator Carly Strocker presses for adherence to Anderson going forward, arguing that “tattooing, a process inexplicably linked to
the creation of tattoos, must be protected with the same fervor as the process
that creates any other pure speech.”61 Strocker adamantly argues against
anti-tattooing zoning laws because “courts [in support of such bans] fail to
consider the fact that prohibiting legal tattoo parlors within city limits pushes
tattoo parlors underground.”62 This result ironically increases the health risks
associated with tattooing, the very risks that these zoning laws are supposedly designed to prevent.63 Furthermore, Strocker suspects that “localities
justify the enactment of their respective ordinances by citing the health and
safety of their citizens while also alluding to the ‘unsavory clientele prone to
crime’ that the localities perceive tattoo shops attract,”64 with little if any
consideration granted to the speech-related activity at stake. Although she
might press for an even more expression-protective result than that afforded
in Anderson and argue that the ordinance in Anderson should have been
declared unconstitutional as a prior restraint on protected speech, Strocker
nonetheless supports Anderson’s steps toward recognizing and protecting
tattoos and tattooing as a historically-rooted form of speech.65
When courts subject a ban that is seemingly facially neutral—but actually content-based and potentially animus-driven—to the lower level of
scrutiny, this classification can have far-reaching implications on the underlying parties and tilt the constitutional burden undeservedly in the defendantmunicipality’s favor. My suspicions of animus echo those of Markey and
Strocker, and implicitly, those of the Anderson court. Although I applaud the
Anderson and Coleman courts for recognizing the expression and artistry
inherent in tattooing, this approach still leaves too much room for governments to justify regulations or even prior restraints on the business of tattooing by disingenuously citing health and safety concerns.66 By acknowledging
60.
Id. at 328.
61.
Strocker, supra note 54, at 175.
62.
Id. at 179-80.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 179 (citing Marcel Honoré & Colin Atagi, Ruling May Affect Cities’ Policies
on Tattoo Parlors, DESERT SUN, Sept. 10, 2010, at A1).
65.
Id. at 207.
66.
Of course, the burden placed on cities to justify safety regulations should not be
overly high where the cited concerns are truly justified (supported by insufficient monitoring
resources or suspicion of unlicensed or unethical practitioners, for example, and not merely a
proxy for animus). Judge Noonan’s concurrence in Anderson mirrors this sentiment, insisting
that health considerations necessarily allow a higher degree of regulation for tattooing than,
say, for the press. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir.
2010). An ideal approach would appropriately balance genuine health and safety concerns with
tattooists’ First Amendment right to engage in protected expression. For a discussion of
“Higher Sanitary Standards” in the tattoo industry since the 1990s and current health risks
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that health and safety concerns may be “relevant to the governmental interest
potentially justifying a restriction on protected speech,” but that they are not
relevant “to whether the speech is constitutionally protected,” the Anderson
court slyly implies its disapproval of other courts’ reasoning in past tattoo
cases.67 The court’s observation suggests that other courts have conflated the
determination of constitutional protection with the determination of whether
the governmental interest justifies restrictions, thereby often allowing health
and safety concerns to automatically foreclose any significant discussion on
the threshold issue of whether the speech should be protected. Anderson is
thus instructive for courts in future related cases, redirecting the inquiry first
toward whether the speech is entitled to protection and then toward the
amount of restrictions that may be placed on such speech.
As the other approaches indicate, some judges might still take issue with
Anderson’s recognition of tattooing as pure speech. Judge Noonan disagreed
with some of the court’s analysis in his concurrence, arguing that while tattooing may be purely expressive, it is not always so—“[c]ontext is all” in
making this determination.68 Judge Noonan further observed that “while we
are bound to protect the First Amendment value at issue, we are not bound to
recognize any special aesthetic, literary, or political value in the tattooist’s
toil and trade.”69 But to counter objections that the pure speech categorization seems radical, the majority opinion does not advocate for special recognition of the tattooist’s trade—it merely expresses desire for equal
recognition and protection to that received by other expressive mediums,
such as writing and painting.
Since the majority holds that tattooing is akin to writing, it should (and
does) follow in the majority’s opinion that tattooing is equally deserving of
protection as writing. And is it not true that while writing may be purely
expressive, it is not always so? The logical extension of Judge Noonan’s
objection would be to apply his context-dependent inquiry equally to all
forms of expressive activity, as arguably context matters in all mediums of
communication in determining whether that speech is purely expressive or
merely contains a secondary expressive component. However, such a solution would collapse the bridge created by the majority between tattooing and
the resulting tattoos, and would subject the amount of First Amendment protection received by tattooing (and other creative processes) to an inefficient
and unpredictable case-by-case inquiry. The difficulties with this approach
will be discussed in Part I.C.
related to tattooing, including whether tattooing is still as dangerous as it used to be, see
Markey, supra note 56, at 317–19, 325–26; see also Strocker, supra note 54, at 200–01 (arguing that “even if [ink-related] health hazards had once been sufficient to outweigh the full First
Amendment protection of the tattoos’ expression, they are no longer categorically so.”).
67.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
68.
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1068.
69.
Id. at 1069.
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B. The No-Protection Approach: Tattooing is Unprotected Because it is
Neither Expressive Conduct nor Pure Speech.
Although most courts are willing to concede that tattoos themselves
have expressive or speech-like qualities, some courts have applied an approach which treats the “speech-like nature of tattoos [as] entirely irrelevant.”70 By defining the threshold inquiry as “‘whether the actual process of
tattooing, as opposed to the image conveyed by the tattoo itself,’ is sufficiently communicative,”71 this approach effectively precludes tattooing from
recognition as expressive activity and from eligibility for First Amendment
protection. Since “the normal observer or even the recipient [of the tattoo]
would [not] regard the process of injecting dye into a person’s skin through
the use of needles as communicative,” the process is therefore not sufficiently communicative under Spence.72 The following three cases illustrate
this approach, concluding that tattooing does not merit First Amendment
protection.
In Yurkew v. Sinclair,73 a federal district court considered a constitutional challenge to a ruling issued by a state agency prohibiting tattooists
from renting space on state fairgrounds.74 Yurkew argued that his unique
form of tattooing—which “involv[ed] the use of symbolic imagery, creative
design and complex technique”—qualified as expressive art.75 Yet what
Yurkew saw as “an integrated expressive act”—including the creation of the
design, its skilled application, and the image on the customer’s skin—the
court viewed merely as a “mechanical process.”76 Tattooing was therefore
not expressive conduct under Spence and did not merit First Amendment
protection.77
Nearly two decades later, the South Carolina Supreme Court faced a
similar question and reached an analogous conclusion. In State v. White,
tattooist Robert White challenged a state statute that prohibited tattooing unless performed by a licensed physician in cosmetic or reconstructive surgery.78 Applying the Spence test, the court similarly concluded that the
plaintiff did not make “any showing that the process of tattooing is communicative enough to automatically fall within First Amendment protection.”79
The court further found that “the process of injecting dye” was “not sufficiently communicative to . . . outweigh the risks to public safety.”80 Justice
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Walsh, supra note 13, at 1084.
Id. (citing Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (D. Minn. 1980)).
Id.
Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. 1248.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1076 (citing Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1249).
Id. (citing Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1249).
Id. at 1077.
Id. (citing Yurkew, 495 F. Supp. at 1254).
Id. (citing State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 421 (S.C. 2002)).
White, 560 S.E.2d at 423.
Id.
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Waller dissented, arguing that tattooing does constitute expressive conduct
under Spence; for if a painter who creates an image on canvas has produced
“art” and engaged in First Amendment–protected “speech,” there is “no reason why a tattoo artist who creates the same image on a person’s body
should be entitled to less protection.”81 Yet Justice Waller’s dissent is distinguishable from Anderson because he refrained from classifying the process
of tattooing as pure speech, and instead treated it as expressive conduct subject to the Spence analysis.82
In Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d
656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008)—a case factually similar to Coleman, but with an
opposite outcome—the plaintiff applied for a special-use permit under the
City’s zoning law to open a tattoo studio.83 The City ultimately denied the
plaintiff’s application, citing tattooing as “not the kind of business” it
wanted.84 Applying the Spence test, the court found that the act of tattooing
failed the first prong of the test because the act itself lacked an intent “to
convey a particularized message.”85 Comparing tattooing to a sound truck—
which “enables each customer to express a particularized message” via a
loudspeaker-equipped advertising truck—the court held that “[t]he act of tattooing is one step removed from actual expressive conduct.”86 Therefore,
there could not be any “message” to be understood by viewers under the
second prong of the Spence test. Accordingly, the court held that the act of
tattooing was not entitled to First Amendment protection.87
The non-integrative approach taken by these courts goes against Supreme Court precedent, which suggests that courts should take an integrative
approach—“viewing the speech-producing activity as an inextricable part of
the speech itself”—when determining whether particular conduct merits
First Amendment protection.88 Otherwise, extending the non-integrative
81.
Id. at 425.
82.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1078.
83.
Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
84.
Id. at 658. The City’s admission that a tattoo parlor was “not the kind of business” it
wanted sounds strikingly like animus. But since the court held that the act of tattooing was not
constitutionally-protected free speech, there was no fundamental right at issue, and the City’s
zoning regulation easily passed the required rational basis test as being “substantially related to
[the City’s] municipal planning goals.” Id. at 660 (citing St. John’s United Church of Christ v.
City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2007)). Among others, these goals included the
now familiar “health and/or safety of the community,” and the “character, stability, or intended
development” of the City’s business district. Id. at 660-61.
85.
Id. at 660.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1084; see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791–92 (1989) (taking an integrated approach and asking whether instrumental music
was protected speech where a city ordinance prohibited a concert sponsor from amplifying its
sound levels, rather than first asking whether the process of amplification was sufficiently
communicative without regard to the expressive end of such process—music).
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Spence approach to its logical conclusion, “the argument would rob almost
all . . . speech of [its] constitutional protection,” because when the law
facially prohibits merely a type of conduct, but that conduct does not convey
a “particularized message,” that conduct fails the Spence test and falls
outside the First Amendment’s protection.89 In any case, the meaning of
“sufficiently imbued with elements of communication” from Spence is unclear and provides little guidance to courts. Making this inquiry necessarily
involves delving into the subjective intent of the tattoo artist: did the artist
intend through the process of tattooing to engage in purely expressive activity? Or did the act of tattooing merely contain an expressive component—
primarily an act of business, but indirectly resulting in expression on behalf
of the customer? A stronger and more efficient approach would avoid such
subjective inquiries.
C. The Individualized Approach: Courts Should Utilize a
Case-By-Case Inquiry.
A third approach would require courts to consider each tattooing situation on a case-by-case basis, introducing an objective inquiry. Commentator
Ryan Walsh supports this option, arguing that “[i]nstead of taking the Anderson-Yurkew categorical approach, courts should—on a case-by-case basis—ask whether each claimant’s form of tattooing amounts to artistic selfexpression,” an analysis to be performed “in the tradition of Mastovincenzo
[sic] and White,” inquiring “whether the claimant-tattooist has objectively
manifested an intent to engage in artistic self-expression.”90 Walsh draws a
distinction between old-school “commercial” tattooing and the modern “fine
art” approach utilized by tattoo artists, designing his case-by-case test to
“deny constitutional protection to those tattooists whose motives are purely
commercial (and not at all expressive), while granting protection to those
tattooists who conceive of their work as aesthetically communicative.”91 According to Walsh, commercial-shop tattooing has two distinguishing characteristics which suggest that it is not a form of expression: (1) commercial
shops limit customers’ design choice to standardized stock images, and (2)
tattooing requires only technical skills, not creative ability.92 Fine-art tattooing, on the other hand, is uniquely marked by two aesthetic and speech-like
characteristics: (1) it emphasizes creativity and expression, and (2) its tattooists tend to be professionally trained in art schools.93 But how are courts
supposed to distinguish between the commercial and fine-art approaches
without some sort of “expert” testimony from tattoo artists? Many tattoo
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Walsh, supra note 13, at 1086.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
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parlors employ a combination of both approaches, demonstrating a willingness to work with customers to create original designs as well as offering
books of standard “flash” designs for customers to peruse as a baseline for
creativity. Walsh’s schema does not account for this hybrid form of tattoo
shop.94 Moreover, his argument rests on the faulty premise that it is not possible for tattooists to make a living off of creating “fine-art” tattoos. Once
this premise fails (as it should), the two paradigms of tattoos are conflated
and Walsh’s thesis becomes severely challenged. The fact that money exchanges hands does not make the resulting product any less expressive, as
precedent has established.95
Walsh’s argument contains further fallacies. Walsh agrees with Anderson’s premise that “a proper First Amendment analysis of an allegedly expressive activity ought not to separate the process of creating the expression
from the final product—the expression itself—to determine whether the activity merits protection.”96 If Walsh means to say that the process should
always be viewed in light of the resulting expression, how does he account
for a situation in which the process is not deemed to be expressive? In other
words, if tattooing and the resulting tattoo are not to be analyzed separately,
does that mean that if the process of tattooing is not deemed to be expressive
(based on the tattooist’s lack of objective manifestation of intent to engage
in artistic self-expression), then the resulting tattoo necessarily cannot be
deemed expressive? This argument fails because tattoo bearers seek tattoos
largely for the very purpose of expressing some sort of personal message.97
In other words, Walsh’s argument fails to take into account the fact that
there may be multiple “speakers” in any tattoo transaction. It is true that
there may be only one act of artistic creation—the process of tattooing—but
arguably, the tattoo bearer communicates a message to public viewers on a
daily basis through her own walking, talking skin. Given collaboration with
customers on the design which they desire, it is impossible for 100 percent
of any tattoo to be completely original to that tattooist or indicative of the
tattooist’s own expression alone.98 So if Walsh concedes that the process of
tattooing and the tattoo itself are intertwined and should be examined to94.
Perhaps recognizing this weakness in his argument, Walsh does concede that
“reaching the right result in a tattooing case is [not] simply a matter of putting a claimant’s
methods in the right box—fine art or commercial. Rather . . . the inquiry centers on artistic
expression: Can the claimant be said to speak through her tattooing?” Id. at 1093.
95.
See e.g., Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010);
see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (“It is well
settled that a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because compensation is received; a speaker
is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak.”).
96.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1065.
97.
Obviously, this argument makes an exception for tattoo bearers who have been
forced to bear a particular mark or who drunkenly consented.
98.
For a discussion of the relational and intellectual property norms in the tattoo industry, see infra Part II.
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gether,99 perhaps his “objective intent” inquiry should be broadened to
jointly examine both the tattooist’s and the tattoo bearer’s intentions to engage in artistic expression.
Of course, discerning such objective intent would be difficult for courts,
given the lack of existing judicial standards and a historical uneasiness vis-àvis courts wrestling with the seemingly subjective debate over what forms of
speech can be deemed “worthy” as art. The Coleman court failed to be persuaded by a similar case-by-case approach, such as that used by the court in
Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York.100 In Mastrovincenzo, the Second Circuit concluded that the sale of clothing painted with graffiti was protected by
the First Amendment because “the disseminators of that clothing [were] genuinely and primarily engaged in artistic self-expression” rather than “a
chiefly commercial exercise.”101 Yet the Coleman court wisely points out
that Mastrovincenzo’s case-by-case approach does not apply to “paintings,
photographs, prints and sculptures [that] always communicate some idea or
concept to those who view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment protection,” particularly if one agrees that tattoos are akin to paintings.102 This classification aside, a case-by-case inquiry would simply be
difficult to administer and could have the effect of banning a good deal of
otherwise protected speech if the question of “whether a particular artist
could engage in tattooing” would be turned over to a licensing official to
assess “whether the proposed work is ‘predominantly expressive[.]’”103 Furthermore, the fact that tattoo artists sometimes use standard patterns does not
diminish the available First Amendment protection because it “does not
make the resulting tattoo any less expressive.”104
Although Walsh’s proposal and the Mastrovincenzo test offer an innovative solution to draw judicial attention away from the troubling initial conduct-versus-speech categorization employed in cases like Yurkew and White,
99.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1083 (“This Comment argues that the Yurkew approach,
distinguishing the ‘product’ of tattooing from the physical activity that produced it, is wrong.
If tattoos are themselves purely expressive, then the process by which they are made is also
purely expressive, for the same reason that, because works of literature are expressive, so too
is the creative activity of writing them.”).
100.
Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006). The court here
outlined a three-part inquiry to determine whether a product is predominantly expressive: (1)
the court should “consider whether that item also has a common non-expressive purpose or
utility”; (2) if the court finds that an item has both expressive and non-expressive purposes, it
must determine which purpose dominates; and (3) if an item is found to be predominantly
expressive, the court must “take into account other factors that shed light on how and why an
object is being sold or disseminated.” Id. at 95–96.
101.
Id. at 91.
102.
Coleman, 284 P.3d at 871 (citing Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 92).
103.
Id. (citing Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 92).
104.
Id.; see, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 569-70 (1995) (finding that a speaker “does not forfeit constitutional protection” by
failing “to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication.”).
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it problematically redirects that attention toward a province which many
courts have acknowledged to be particularly ill-suited to judicial determination: what is art?105 Walsh attempts to avoid this problem by suggesting
guideline factors for courts to consider when making findings of an objective
manifestation of intent to engage in self-expression, including “sociological
evidence concerning the significant differences in modern tattooing styles,”
the use of flash images on the parlor walls, and the tattooist’s professional or
artistic training.106 Even though Walsh admits that his proposal “is not a onesize-fits-all solution,” further development of his objective approach might
meet his goal of “extend[ing] constitutional protection only to those meriting
it.”107
Despite its critics, the pure speech approach continues to gain traction in
the legal community, avoiding the challenging subjective inquiries of the noprotection and individualized approaches. An Anderson-like inquiry appropriately questions regulations that restrict tattooing and provides more robust
First Amendment protection, mirroring the collaborative informal copyright
norms discussed in Part II.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NORMS

IN THE

TATTOO INDUSTRY

A. Copyright and Tattoos
An author gains copyright protection when she fixes an original work in
any tangible medium of expression, including pictorial works.108 When determining whether an author has acquired copyright protection, disputes may
arise regarding whether the work is “original” and whether it is “fixed.”
In order to be “original,” a work of authorship need only possess “at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”109 Under Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., even a slight amount of creativity will suffice,
so long as the work “possess[es] some creative spark.”110 Originality in the
copyright context does not mean novelty; rather, a work may be original
despite a close resemblance to other works if the similarity is the not the
105.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1094–95; see, e.g., Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 90 (avoiding resolving whether plaintiffs’ goods fit within “broader societal definitions of ‘art,’ a famously malleable concept the contours of which are best defined not by courts, but in the
proverbial ‘eye of the beholder.’”); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253–54 (D. Minn.
1980) (recognizing that “courts are ill equipped to determine such illusory and imponderable
questions” as whether tattooing is an art form and refraining from making that determination).
However, this is not to say that such difficulty “warrant[s] placing all visual expression in
limbo outside the reach of the First Amendment’s protective arm[;]” the courts must grapple
with the inquiry of what constitutes protected expression. See Bery v. City of New York, 97
F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996).
106.
Walsh, supra note 13, at 1098.
107.
Id. at 1098-99.
108.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
109.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
110.
Id.
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result of copying.111 In other words, originality refers to the independent
origin of a given work. Since originality is a judicially determined concept,
the separation between originality and novelty is desirable in order to maintain some semblance of objectivity and thereby prevent an unreasonably
high bar to copyright protection. As Justice Holmes once aptly stated, “It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”112 Given the low bar for
creativity, most tattoos meet the originality requirement.113
A work is “fixed” when its embodiment is “sufficiently permanent . . .
to permit it to be perceived . . . or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.”114 Under the plain language of the copyright
statute, tattoos inked on the human body constitute sufficiently permanent
displays of images to satisfy the fixation requirement and merit copyright
protection, as long as they also meet the originality test outlined above. Assuming that the fixation standard appropriately applies to tattoos, laser removal of a tattoo would not render the tattoo any less transitory than
physical destruction of a painting after its creation. Accordingly, copyright
protection subsists in tattoos that constitute fixed, original works of authorship, with the bulk of any controversy focusing on authorship.
1. Copyright Ownership
Copyright vests initially in the “author” of a work of authorship.115
When copyright does subsist in a tattoo, the author is entitled to benefit from
a statutory list of exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce the
work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, and to display the
copyrighted work publicly.116 The determination of authorship therefore establishes which party—or parties—receives these rights.
Depending on the circumstances, the tattooer, the client, or both may be
considered the author. Four potential authorship situations may arise through
the application of a tattoo: (1) sole author in the tattooer; (2) joint authorship
in the tattooer and client; (3) a work for hire that deems the commissioner to
be the author; and (4) sole author in the customer.
111.
See id.
112.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
113.
Overly cliché tattoos—such as a heart with a dagger inside, which is likely an unprotectable scène à faire, or “stock” image common to the tattoo trade—may not meet the
originality requirement. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
114.
Id. § 101.
115.
Id. § 201(a).
116.
Id. § 106.
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Where the tattooer uses a human “canvas” to create an artistic work as
she chooses, the tattooer is the clear author, analogous to a portrait painter.117
In this first authorship situation, the tattooer is the sole author. The portrait
painter owns the copyright to her work, even if the work includes the image
of another person, or another person owns the material object on which the
work is embedded.118 But in the case of the tattooer, the material object is a
human body, making the analogy a bit trickier to comprehend, with potentially disconcerting consequences for human autonomy when literally applied. Yet whether the canvas is inanimate or living flesh, formal copyright
law provides that “[o]wnership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in
which the work is embodied.”119 For those unconvinced by the painter analogy, the plain language of this clause provides reassurance that copyright
ownership grants rights in the material object and not in the adorned subject’s body.120
When a work is commissioned, however, authorship can be more complicated. In this second authorship scenario, the resulting tattoo may be
viewed as a “joint work,” meaning that it is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”121 This result requires both the client and the tattooer to contribute independently copyrightable expression to
the resulting tattoo.122 The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in that work.123 In the tattoo context, joint authorship allows each
owner to use or to license the work, provided the owner accounts to other
co-owners for any profits.124
A second authorship possibility for commissioned tattoos is the “work
for hire,” in which case ownership vests initially in the commissioning party

117.
Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 104 (2003).
118.
Id.
119.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
120.
But see Meredith Hatic, Who Owns Your Body Art?: The Copyright and Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 396, 403 (2012)
(explaining that in exercising some exclusive rights, “the owner’s rights will nevertheless interfere with the subject’s constitutional right to control his own body”); but cf. Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing a constitutional right to
choices of personal dignity and autonomy). For a brief discussion of the unintended and perhaps unconstitutional consequences of a literal application of copyright law to public displays
of tattoos, see infra Part II.B.2.
121.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
122.
Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 117, at 105 (citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000)).
123.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
124.
See Hatic, supra note 120, at 404; see also Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d
1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
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or the employer—not the tattoo artist.125 This analysis can result in either a
third authorship scenario where the commissioner is the author, or a fourth
authorship scenario where the customer is the author. A work for hire is a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,
or a work specially ordered or commissioned to fit within a list of nine categories that treat the tattooer as an independent contractor.126 Under the first
prong of the work for hire test, if the creating tattoo artist is an employee of
a tattoo shop and creates the original tattoo within the scope of his or her
employment, then the employer for whom the work is prepared is considered
the author unless the parties have otherwise agreed in a signed writing.127 In
the absence of a clear, written contract that assigns copyright ownership to
either the employer or the employee, a court must determine whether the
artist is an employee using common-law agency doctrine.128 The court must
consider whether the commissioning party had the right and ability to control that manner by which the tattoo was made, influenced by factors such
as: the level of skill required; the source of the tools utilized; the location of
the work; the duration of the relationship between the employer and the artist; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired
party.129 Some of these factors, such as the degree of skill involved in the
tattoo’s application, might weigh in favor of classifying the tattoo artist as an
independent contractor.130
The “work for hire” doctrine can also apply to independent contractors
if two conditions are met. First, the work must fit within one of the nine
categories enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 101.131 Second, the parties must “expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire,”132 in which case the commissioning party
125.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them,
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”).
126.
See id. § 101 (defining “work made for hire”). Under this section, the nine categories for commissioned works include works “specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” Id.
127.
Id. § 201(b).
128.
Beasley, supra note 44, at 1143 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1989)).
129.
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52; Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 117, at 105-106.
130.
Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 117, at 106.
131.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire”). However, meeting this condition would require the commissioning party to establish that the tattoos at issue constitute
specially commissioned works as part of a “collective work.” Even if the tattooer contributes
an original tattoo to a subject’s existing set of tattoos, it is doubtful that this could be classified
as a collective work. See Hatic, supra note 120, at 404-05.
132.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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would own the copyright. In the absence of such an agreement, the independent tattooer would be deemed the author.
A tattoo might meet the definition of a work for hire in several situations. For example, the tattoo shop that employs an artist might claim that
the artist’s work product is a work for hire because her tattoos are made in
the scope of her employment.133 Or, the client might claim an exclusive copyright on the theory that she paid the artist to create the tattoo, making the
tattoo a work for hire prepared by the artist within the scope of her employment.134 Yet even if the tattoo is not a work for hire, the employer or commissioning party could demand that the artist assign the copyright as a
condition of providing services.135 Although complicated, establishing authorship has important implications in terms of the level of protection provided to the parties and the rights afforded to the copyright holder under 17
U.S.C. § 106. The next section highlights discrepancies between the outcomes suggested by the plain language of formal copyright law and the informal copyright norms held and practiced by tattooers.
B. Tattooers and the Law: Tensions Illustrated
Tensions between tattoo industry norms regarding artists’ and customers’ expectations of protected speech and how formal copyright law and
courts treat such speech abound.136 Perhaps surprisingly, “[c]opyright suits
between tattooers and their clients, or suits between two tattooers, are virtually non-existent,” with the exception of two post-millennial lawsuits to be
discussed within this section.137 The lack of related case law likely stems
from law professor Aaron Perzanowski’s observation that “[a]s a community, tattooers share a deep skepticism of the legal system,”138 preferring to
avoid filing formal legal complaints. This skepticism is arguably justified in
light of the long history of targeted zoning regulations that have practically
banned tattooists’ trade,139 as well as tattooists’ “celebrat[ion of] their status
as outsiders who operate without regard to established social conven133.
Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 117, at 105.
134.
Id. at 106.
135.
Id. at 107.
136.
See Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoo & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145048 (discussing the doctrinal hurdles and practical barriers to enforcement that shape the relationship between formal
law and tattoo industry norm).
137.
Id. at 19.
138.
Id. at 48, 50.
139.
When viewed in light of this history, in which interactions between the tattoo industry and U.S. law have largely been confined to health regulations, the relative dearth of interactions between tattooing and intellectual property law may seem less surprising. See Beasley,
supra note 44, at 1146–47.
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tions.”140 As a result, “tattooers have developed a set of informal norms to
structure the creative process and relationships within their industry.”141
Yet the very existence of these norms, and the respect given by artists to
each customer’s autonomy, implies that tattoo artists view the process of
tattooing as inextricably intertwined with the resulting tattoos. As discussed
in Part I, these norms are somewhat reflected in the recent tattoo landmark
cases Anderson and Coleman to the extent that the cases’ integrative approach toward tattooing and tattoos indirectly acknowledges the existence of
multiple speakers in any given tattoo transaction: the artist and the customer.
But as Perzanowski notes, Anderson, “while making a notable departure
from prior judicial attitudes towards tattooing, still reflect[s] hints of the
hostility that marred earlier opinions,” particularly in Judge Noonan’s “begrudging” concurrence.142
Although “[t]attooers [are] somewhat more sympathetic to leveraging
formal legal rights . . . to target unauthorized use of their designs on apparel
or other merchandise,” their reluctance to endorse the judicial system stems
largely from “more specific norms governing the creative process and the
tattooer-client relationship.”143 For example, although formal copyright law
would treat most custom designs as works created by the tattooist alone, the
consultation and design process is very collaborative and “sensitive to client
preferences,” since clients “exercise the final choice over whether the design
is ultimately transformed from a drawing on paper to a tattoo on the
body.”144 Interestingly, most tattooists take a broad view of their customers’
rights with respect to public display and reproduction of the images on their
tattooed bodies, which are formally exclusive rights of the copyright holder
(perhaps the tattooist, but the ownership debate abounds).145 Although some
artists might be offended if a customer sought to make a broad commercial
use of the artist’s design, overall, “tattoo industry norms place a premium on
establishing and maintaining the relationship between the tattooer and the
client.”146

140.
Perzanowski, supra note 136, at 50.
141.
Id. at 14.
142.
Id. at 54; see Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
143.
Perzanowski, supra note 136, at 21; see, e.g., Verified Complaint for Injunctive and
Other Relief, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011)
(protecting a tattoo design from being reproduced in a movie) [hereinafter Whitmill
Complaint].
144.
Perzanowski, supra note 136, at 23.
145.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright holders); Perzanowski, supra note 136 at 24-25. Like any other original pictorial work that is fixed in a
tangible medium, tattoos are protected by copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5); id. at 14. Yet
perhaps unsurprisingly, “the formal conclusions of copyright law do not dictate how tattooers
conceptualize their ownership interests in their work.” Id. at 23.
146.
Perzanowski, supra note 136, at 26.
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Despite the informal norms that have developed in the tattoo industry,
occasionally an act of alleged infringement sees its day in court (although
unsuccessfully, to date). The following cases help illustrate how ineffectually formal intellectual property law has responded and might continue to
respond to the constantly increasing visibility of tattooing.
1. Reed v. Nike, Inc.: Tattooer Sues Client for Copyright Infringement
In 1998, NBA player Rasheed Wallace had just been traded to the Portland Trailblazers. Matthew Reed, a self-employed and renowned tattoo artist
based in Portland, met with Wallace to discuss ideas for Wallace’s tattoo.147
Wallace suggested his own ideas for meshing an Egyptian-themed family
design with a stylized sun in the background while Reed listened, took notes,
and made sketches.148 Wallace asked for a few changes, which Reed incorporated into the final drawing. Wallace paid $450 for the tattoo, a price
which Reed considered low but agreed to accept given the great amount of
exposure he would receive from the tattoo being on an NBA player.149 Notably, before inking the tattoo onto Wallace’s upper right arm, the parties
failed to execute any written agreement transferring ownership to Wallace of
any rights in the tattoo design.150
In 2004, Wallace won an NBA championship as a player for the Detroit
Pistons.151 During the championship run, Reed saw the tattoo highlighted in
an advertising campaign promoting Nike products in a national television
broadcast and all over Nike’s website.152 The advertisement featured the tattoo filling the screen in a close up, followed by “the tattoo and the process of
its creation . . . simulated by a computerized method with a voice over by
Mr. Wallace describing the tattoo and its meaning.”153 Reed sued Nike, Wallace, and the advertising agency for copyright infringement in 2005.154 In his
complaint, Reed alleged that he was the sole “owner of all right, title and
interest to the original artwork from which the tattoo on Mr. Wallace’s arm
was created” and that the defendants “copied, reproduced, distributed,
adapted and/or publicly displayed” Reed’s copyrighted work without his
147.
See Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 315 (2006).
148.
Id. at 315; Associated Press, Artist Sues Wallace over Use of Tattoo, ESPN (Feb.
16, 2005, 1:54 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/sportsbusiness/news/story?id=1992812.
149.
Harkins, supra note 147, at 316; Associated Press, supra note 148.
150.
Harkins, supra note 147, at 315.
151.
David DuPree, Pistons Win First NBA Title in 14 Years, Finish Lakers 100-87, USA
TODAY (June 16, 2004, 3:31 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/games/
2004-06-15-finals-game5_x.htm.
152.
Harkins, supra note 147, at 316.
153.
Complaint ¶ 15, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 05-CV-198 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Reed Complaint].
154.
See id. ¶¶ 1, 17; Beasley, supra note 44, at 1147.
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consent.155 Reed’s direct claim against his client Wallace violated the informal norms underlying the collaborative client-artist relationship. Perhaps
Reed’s actions can be explained by what he perceived as a golden opportunity to make an unexpected profit—one which was potentially undeserved
or unintended through a copyright lens, whether or not Reed was truly the
sole owner.
Although the parties dismissed the case in October 2005 without leaving
any definitive guidance for tattoo jurisprudence,156 the Reed case effectively
demonstrates the competing interests involved in copyright infringement,
from the client’s right to publicity and the artist’s right of ownership to the
public’s right to benefit from subsequent works featuring an original tattoo.157 Had the case reached litigation, the court would necessarily have
faced the daunting task of balancing all of these competing interests, a more
complicated inquiry than in traditional copyright cases where the medium is
not the human body.158 This judicial challenge is perhaps one reason why
tattooers have developed a set of informal expectations to avoid the courts
altogether whenever possible.
2. Whitmill v. Warner Bros.: Tattooer Sues Company for
Copyright Infringement
In 2003, tattoo artist Victor Whitmill designed an original tattoo for former heavyweight champion Mike Tyson, resulting in a claim, similar to the
one in the Reed case, against Warner Brothers Entertainment.159 On the day
Whitmill created the tattoo, Tyson signed a release acknowledging “that all
artwork, sketches and drawings related to [his] tattoo and any photographs
of [his] tattoo [were] property” of Whitmill’s studio.160 The now famous
tribal tattoo on the left side of Tyson’s face featured prominently in the
Warner Bros. 2011 blockbuster The Hangover 2 and its accompanying marketing materials, where one of the main characters—played by Ed Helms—
gets a tattoo on the left side of his face that almost exactly copies Tyson’s
tattoo.161Whitmill sued Warner Bros. for copyright infringement, alleging
that he was the sole creator and author of the tattoo and producing Tyson’s
155.
Reed Complaint, supra note 153, ¶¶ 19, 21. In addition to seeking an injunction
against both companies, Reed also requested actual damages and profits earned by the defendants pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). Id. ¶¶ 25–26. He further demanded an accounting of any
revenue realized by Wallace as the result of any use, other than an incidental use, of the tattoo,
as well as a share of the revenue realized by Wallace from his exploitation of the co-owned
property. Id. ¶¶ 37–39.
156.
See Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 05-CV-198-BR
(D. Or. Oct. 19, 2005).
157.
Hatic, supra note 120, at 419.
158.
See id. at 419–20.
159.
See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 143, ¶¶ 5, 11-22.
160.
Id. ¶ 7.
161.
See id. ¶¶ 12–16.
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signed release form.162 Despite openly stating her sympathies toward
Whitmill, Judge Perry of the Eastern District of Missouri denied Whitmill’s
request to enjoin the release of The Hangover 2, finding that the public interest tilted in favor of Warner Brothers.163
While Whitmill settled out of court just like Reed, both cases nonetheless illustrate similar conflicts among the interests that arise in tattoo infringement cases and raise complicated questions about the extent to which
copyright holders’ 17 U.S.C. § 106 rights should be read literally. Of the
section 106 rights, the owner’s right to publicly display the work presents
the greatest likelihood of directly interfering with the subject’s constitutional
right to personal autonomy.164 Where the tattooer is deemed the sole owner
of a tattoo, a literal reading of this right would conceivably require customers to refrain from showing their tattoos in public in order to avoid violating
section 106(5).165 But arguably, at least, such a holding would not fall within
the intended consequences of the Copyright Act since it would amount to
“control by tattoo,” bearing an uncomfortable resemblance to involuntary
servitude.166 Constitutional arguments aside, the informal norms discussed
above render it unlikely that tattooers would attempt to bring such a claim in
violation of the collaborative tattooer-customer relationship. Furthermore,
the norms suggest the existence of an implied license that forms at the time
of a tattoo’s creation, including the right to display the tattoo publicly during
the normal course of life and to make alterations to the design.167 Although
not formally recognized by the law, such norms help attenuate autonomy
concerns and deter infringement claims that would otherwise completely undermine the purposes of getting tattoos.168

162.
See generally id. at 7-8 (seeking a preliminary and a permanent injunction as well as
compensatory damages and an award of Warner Bros.’s profits resulting from the alleged
infringement).
163.
See Noam Cohen, Citing Public Interest, Judge Rules for “Hangover II”, N.Y.
TIMES (May 24, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/citingpublic-interest-judge-rules-for-hangover-ii/?_r=0 (“[A]ll over the country people would be losing money if I were to enjoin this movie.“).
164.
See Hatic, supra note 120, at 408.
165.
Id.
166.
See Craig P. Bloom, Note, Hangover Effect: May I See Your Tattoo, Please, 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 439 (2013) (arguing the statutory rights vested in a copyright
holder do not amount to involuntary servitude since the act of receiving a tattoo is almost
always a voluntary decision).
167.
Id. at 460-63 (discussing the test for implied licenses laid out in Effects Associates,
Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), which requires a design request, design delivery,
and intent to grant a license). Given the permanent nature of tattoos, the tattoo artist presumably understands that when a customer leaves the shop, “the sole power to direct how the tattoo
is used no longer resides” with the tattooer. Id. at 464.
168.
Id. at 463.
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C. The Need to Reform the Norms: A New Constitutional Theory of
Tattoo Protection
As the above discussion suggests, the application of formal legal doctrine to body art could have broad and disturbing implications, given the use
of the human body as the medium in which the copyrighted works are fixed.
For example, what is the appropriate remedy if a tattoo is itself infringing?
Could a court properly order that person to remove or cover up the tattoo
without violating constitutional norms of privacy, bodily integrity, or free
speech?169 Courts have not yet tackled these difficult questions, perhaps due
to the difficulty of monitoring tattoo subjects and their bodies, as well as
concern on behalf of tattooers that bringing claims against their famous clients would aggravate fans and harm their businesses.170 Although the answers to these challenging questions fall beyond the scope of this Note,
raising them suggests that a multiplicity of speakers and authors exist in
each tattoo transaction.
The law should address the ambiguities currently present in tattoo protection, particularly encouraging the creation of tattoos by protecting the
process of tattooing. In Part III, I argue that future tattoo jurisprudence
should reflect and give deference to the collaborative client-tattooer relationship, taking affirmative steps toward applying an integrative approach à la
Anderson and Coleman. Such an approach would adequately protect the
complexities, norms, and relationships inherent in the tattoo industry. In general, lawmakers and policymakers should be “respectful of the norms that
have developed among tattoo artists,”171 and should allow changes in the
tattoo industry to inform further development of related laws in order to
more accurately protect freedom of expression and to encourage the creation
of new works of art deserving of copyright protection. The following Part
bridges the gap between First Amendment and copyright discussions of tattoo jurisprudence, advocating for a multi-speaker, circumstantial approach
that better coordinates with the authorship inquiries under copyright law.
III. RECONCILING COPYRIGHT AND FIRST AMENDMENT NORMS
ROBUST TATTOOING PROTECTION

FOR

The act of tattooing can have a cathartic effect upon customers who seek
meaningful designs that signify personal accomplishments or milestones, as
well as on the tattooers who use customers’ stories as inspiration to create
the collaborative designs. When premeditated, taking such permanent action
serves as an indicator of commitment and self-control. Emotional catharsis
can also result from tattoos that symbolize a painful memory from one’s
past, with the act of tattooing signifying the “healing” of that past wound
169.
170.
171.

Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 117, at 100.
See id. at 101.
Beasley, supra note 44, at 1176–77.
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through permanency, acceptance, and helping the bearer begin or complete
the grieving process.172 The tattooer-customer relationship therefore creates
an “exchange of energy” that results in expression on behalf of both the
tattooer and the customer.173 Consequently, a constitutional theory that embraces tattooing as pure speech would better recognize the emotive and collaborative nature of these tattoo transactions, protect multiple speakers’
expressions, and align with informal copyright norms.
I propose that courts should take an approach that expands on Anderson’s recognition of tattooing as pure speech by reevaluating and increasing
the level of scrutiny that should be applied to municipal near-bans on tattooing. Particularly, courts should scrutinize “content-neutral” bans at the highest level. In both Anderson and Coleman, the courts found that the
regulations—which effectively banned all tattoo parlors (either by omission
or by granting the city council virtually unfettered discretion, respectively)—were not content-based, because they did not ban only those parlors
conveying a particular kind of subject matter.174 But banning an entire category of speech seems to be the very definition of a content-based restriction,
especially if such speech is prohibited before it can even be created and
disseminated. Accepting the established premise that tattoos constitute pure
speech, an intentional ban on the conduct leading up to the creation of that
pure speech necessarily bans all tattoo-related content. Viewed as a pragmatic matter, then, such purportedly “content-neutral” bans might not be so
evenhanded. Affording the act of tattooing fuller First Amendment protec-

172.
See generally Marisa Gwidt, Tattoos for Catharsis, BUZZ (May 25, 2012), http://
readbuzz.com/arts/2012/tattoos-for-catharsis (providing personal examples about the psychology of pain in tattooing).
173.
See Shawn Loeffler, Interview: Kat Von D, ASKMEN, http://www.askmen.com/
celebs/interview_250/288b_kat_von_d_interview.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (discussing
how through the dynamic exchange, celebrity tattooer Kat Von D has learned many valuable
life lessons from her clients and shared in their personal emotional stories).
174.
See supra Part I.A. For example, I would argue that the zoning regulation in Anderson is one which could pass as content-neutral, but which in reality was artfully drafted to
specifically exclude those types of businesses that the local government did not deem to be in
its best interests (by including an exhaustive list of specifically-allowed types of businesses). If
such a regulation were actually content-neutral, then as a practical matter, it would not result in
a total ban on a particular kind of activity. Content-based regulations must pass strict scrutiny,
meaning that they are “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and are “narrowly drawn
to achieve that end[.]” Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir.
2010) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
Where the claim is not that the regulation is content-based, however, the level of scrutiny is
somewhat lower: the regulation must only be a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on
restricted speech. This test asks whether the restriction is (1) “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech”; (2) is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest”; and (3) “leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1064 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)).
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tion via increased judicial skepticism would help level the playing field for
tattoos as an expressive medium that is every bit akin to writing or painting.
My solution requires courts to apply strict scrutiny to all content-based
speech regulations, which will require courts to look beyond the actual text
of the regulation to its practical or intended effects. I will call this the “Anderson-Plus” approach to tattooing protection. As a practical matter, judges
(and future First Amendment jurisprudence) would benefit from immersion
in the detailed and relationship-oriented norms of the tattoo industry and its
history of targeted regulations in order to bring a more balanced view to the
courtroom. In conjunction with revisiting the proper scrutiny inquiry, the
Anderson-Plus approach would protect not only tattooists’ right to engage in
their trade, but also the right of potential customers to engage in protected
expression. Specifically, it would protect the latter right by ensuring that
tattoo parlors are (1) safe and appropriately-regulated to comply with health
standards (i.e., not forced underground)175 and (2) not altogether prohibited
under unreasonable zoning regulations or licensing restrictions. Although
some may argue that it is not the judge’s role to pause and consider the
driving forces behind a given regulation’s drafting, a more thoughtful analysis of the appropriate level of scrutiny in each case (by both attorneys and
judges) would help ensure that our resulting case law protects the expression
of the parties who deserve it the most. Such below-the-surface inquiries are,
I believe, necessary in order to continue granting tattooing the full speech
protections established in Anderson.
A. First Amendment Implications
A broader swath of tattooing activities would receive stronger First
Amendment protection under the Anderson-Plus approach. But since only a
small percentage of American courts are currently bound by Anderson and
Coleman, many others remain free to categorize tattooing as conduct rather
than expressive activity or pure speech. In the latter category of courts, this
threshold inquiry as it exists gives too much discretion to judges to make
this initial classification, with inadequate guidelines for determining how
and when to apply the vague legal standards provided by the relevant First
Amendment cases. From the drastically different outcomes discussed in each
of the three approaches in Part I, it is evident that the initial conduct-versusexpressive activity classification can have dire consequences on the judicial
fate of the tattooing process, the underlying businesses, and tattoo artists’
and their clients’ abilities to engage in expression by producing tattoos. A
judge opposed to tattooing as a general matter can easily frame the issue by
declaring tattooing to be expressive conduct, thus subjecting it to the Spence
test and finding that it is not “sufficiently imbued” with communicative
elements.
175.

See Strocker, supra note 54, at 205.

Fall 2013]

Getting Down to (Tattoo) Business

213

The counter-argument is that a more tattoo-friendly judge could just as
easily frame the issue by declaring tattooing to be protectable expressive
activity, with similarly unguided discretion beyond this initial classification.
But the Anderson-Plus approach does not seek to radically change the existing paradigms. Instead, requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to all content-based speech regulations would serve to place tattoos and the process of
tattooing on equal First Amendment grounds with paintings and the process
of painting. Anderson-Plus merely aims to level the playing field for different mediums of the same expressive nature by urging judges to treat speechrelated regulations with an appropriate level of skepticism when applying
existing constitutional laws.
B. Copyright Implications
The Anderson-Plus approach enhances the current copyright legal landscape surrounding tattoos by recognizing the complexities inherent in multispeaker transactions. The recognition of both tattoos and the process of tattooing as deserving of First Amendment protection better squares with the
existing authorship regime under copyright law. For example, the questions
asked under a First Amendment analysis (Who is the speaker? Whose
speech should be protected?) might be viewed as analogous to the determination of authorship under copyright law. Just as a First Amendment inquiry
should look beneath the surface of each speech regulation to identify the
amount and origins of the banned speech, copyright law looks to the individual circumstances of each case in order to determine authorship. To return to
the tattoo versus painting analogy, a tattoo deserves no less First Amendment or copyright protection than a painting.176 A commissioned painting or
tattoo would receive no less First Amendment or copyright protection than
one an artist independently designed, although the resulting authors would
differ based on the applicable sole author, joint author, or work for hire
analysis. Extending this reasoning via the pure speech protections of the Anderson-Plus approach would logically align with copyright’s low bar to originality, thereby allowing the continued production and expression of a fuller
range of copyrightable images as well as client and tattooer speech.
Additionally, affording tattooing a higher level of First Amendment protection may have the long-term consequence of making the accompanying
copyright protection for the resulting tattoos more robust, since if the art
form is deemed worthy of the law’s protection on one ground, this effect is
more likely to carry over to other areas of the law. In this manner, the Anderson-Plus approach helps bridge the gap between existing First Amendment
and copyright tattoo norms.
176.

See notes 39–41, 109–114 and accompanying text.

214

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 20:183

CONCLUSION
Despite its “countercultural origins,” the tattoo industry does not significantly differ from other creative industries like painting or publishing, in that
it “capitalizes on market demand for original creative works.”177 Tattooers
should therefore receive the same robust speech protections as writers or
painters. Cases like Anderson and Coleman have taken commendable steps
toward recognizing and protecting tattoos and tattooing as historically-rich
forms of speech deserving of First Amendment protection, suggesting that
the finished products are worthy of formal protections as well. The Anderson-Plus approach outlined above expands on this perspective by applying a
higher level of scrutiny to all content-based speech regulations. It would also
provide an additional safeguard to ensure that municipal regulations are not
being used as prior restraints that place “unbridled discretion in the hands of
government official[s] or agenc[ies,]”178 thus granting First Amendment protection to a fuller range of deserving, creative expression. This approach
would further integrate the spirit of informal copyright norms into tattoo
jurisprudence by recognizing the multiple layers of expression and authorship involved in each tattoo transaction. As speech protection for tattooing
continues to develop, the Anderson-Plus approach will save judges from facing the unguided task of struggling to apply formal copyright doctrine and
subjective inquiries to tattoos themselves, embodied on a living canvas
rather than an inanimate work.

177.
Perzanowski, supra note 136, at 3.
178.
See Strocker, supra note 54, at 206 (quoting Voigt v. City of Medford, No. 200500163F, 2007 WL 738750, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2007)).

